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LYMAN V. TOWNSEND.
The rent of a dwelling for the pqrpose of keepinga bUrothel mal' be recovered
from the lessee, by suit, if the statute and the city ordinanoes authorize the
keeping of brothels.

This was a suit on a contract of lease. The plaintiff alleged
that he leased to the defendant a house in New Orleans, on
Custom-house street, for a term of five years from Debember
1, 1866, at the rate of $200 per month,' payable in advance;
and that the defendant failed to pay -the rent in accordance
with the contract. He seized provisionally the furniture in
the house in virtue of his lien as lessor.
The defendant averred that, in conformity with her engagement, she paid the rent at the -rate of $200 per Month, np to
the first of February, 1868, and since that time she had.paid,
by agreement with and consent of the plaintiff, $150 per
month, as compensation in full for the rent per month. She
further alleged that.thebuilding that she leased from plaintiff
was used as a house of prostitution, and intended so to be used
at the time the lease was made, and that with the knowledge
and consent of the plaintiff; that the contract was void, as being
one reprobated by law and contrary to good morals;
There was judgment in the court below of non-suit, and the
plaintiff appealed.
J S. Whitaker, for plaintiff.
L. .fadison Day, for defendant.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
- TALIAFERRO, J.-It will, in the first place, be proper to inquire whether the keeping of brothels or houses of prostitution is prohibited by law. By the Statutes of 1855, relative
to crimes and offenses, page 144, section ninety-two, under
the head of offenses against public order, health and police, it
is enacted: "That whoever shall be guilty of keeping any
disorderly inn, tavern, ale house, tippling house or brothel
shall suffer fine or imprisonment or both, at the discretion of
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the court; and the offender may likewise be adjudged to forfeit his license to keep a house of public resort or entertainment." The prohibition here expressed is not against the
keeping of houses of the kind mentioned, but against the keeping of disorderly houses of the character specified.
In the case of the City of New Orleans v. Eliza Castello 14
La. Annual 37, this court said, in reference to this ninetysecond section of the act of 1855, that it does not prevent the
city from levying a tax upon boarding-houses kept for these
people (meaning lewd women), provided they do not license
disorderly houses of this class. The city heretofore levied
"an anhiual license tax of two hundred and fifty dollars ,upon
each and every person keeping any house, room or dwelling,
for the purpose of renting rooms to or boarding lewd and
abandoned women."
Whether such license tax is now enforced or not we are
not apprised. The city clearly has the right to enforce a
license tax of that kind. It appears that, by ordinance of the
city, certain districts and localities are defined within which
alone the keeping of houses of the class mentioned in the
ninety-second section of the act of 1855 is permitted, and it
is shown that the house leased by the plaintiff to the defendant is situated within one of these districts. It seems, then,
that no law of this State prohibits the disreputable calling or
occupation which the defendant in this case is not slow in
admitting that she is engaged in. It permits such trade or
occupation on the condition that it be prosecutedinan orderly
manner, and within certain specified limits.
Homes are indispensable for the shelter and lodgment of
the persons so employed. Is it unlawful for the owner to
lease a house for such a purpose? If his fate be so cast that
his buildings fall within localities in some sense degraded by
the lawmaker, subjecting them to the annoyance of public
brothels, should he be debarred from deriving revenue from
the lease of his buildings to be used for such establishments?
He is required to pay a pro rata tax upon his property, which,
it might be, from its unfortunate location, could not be leased
for any other purpose. The question may be answered by
recurring to the right we find that persons of the class of the
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defendant possess under the law to keep houses of ill fame.
With that right they are impliedly vested with the right to
buy or lease buildings for their business.
.The right to lease a house to be used for the purposes of a
brothel implies "&corresponding right to the owner to let a
house for that purpose.
Contracts for. such purposes are repulsive to- the moral
sense, but when allowed by law, what warrant is there for de'claring them null as being contrary to good morals? Courts
have not to deal with the question whether laws sancti6ning
contracts of the kind are wise or unwise; upon the legislator
is"
imposed that difficult- and ungrateful task. 'It is for him
to encounter the danger of passing between Scylla and
Charybdis. It is for him in pondering the vexed problem to"
view society just as it is and not as we desire it should be.
His trouble in this direction is that he can raise man's moral'
standard no higher than his physical condition will permit.
It is for him to divine in regard to these things, whether from
necessity great evils must not be tolerated in order that greater
ones may be avoided-whether he should mitigate; even if it
.be at the expense of enactments offensive to the moral sentiment, deep-rooted evils which he is unabl 'successfully to
combat. Upon such a basis many of the strong thinkers
of the present day are inclined to legislate.
In the case- now under consideration, if we should decide
the issue adversely to the plaintiff there would be presented
the awkward anomaly of the defendant being able legally to
lease the plaintiff's house for disreputable purposes, and after
having used it for many months, avoid payment according to
ctntract by openly avowing her own turpitude, in pleading
in defense her violation of morals in the use to which she put
the premises leased. To annul the contract in the interest of
defendant would seem to outrage morals at least as much as
it would to enforce it in behalf of the plaintiff.
As opposed to the views here intimated, we are referred to
the decision of this court in the case of Kathna v. Walters,
22 La. Annual, page 54.
The opinion in that case,
after a more thorough and deliberate consideration of the
subject, we are not inclined to sustain. In the case at bar,
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we think that the plaintiff should prevail. It is therefore
ordered that. the judgment appealed from be annulled, that
the plaintiff have judgment.
HOWELL, J., dissented.
The foregoing decision cannot fail to of her larger cities probably, certainly
be regarded by the profession as one of in Paris. And we need feel no horror
interest. It is not discussed much, that the highest judicial tribunals of
with regard to the decisions upon one of the American States should so
other analogous questions, except in construe its statutes and municipal orthe State of Louisiana. Indeed the dinances as to recognize the legalized
American decisions are now becoming existence of brothels within its limits.
so numerous, and are placed so much And if so, we do not see how any good
upon first principles, without regard to lawyer can object much to the soundauthority, that we can scarcely require ness of the foregoing opinion, so far as
any State to depart from that rule. the principle of the decision is conAnd we may pursue a somewhat simi- cerned.
Some of the arguments of the learned
lar course in discussing the case.
It is conceded, in the opinion, that judge-where he urges the unreasonthe contract was made 'In furtherance ableness of allowing the defendant to
of a business entirely "repulsive to the allege her own turpitude in defense of
moral sense." As a general rule, such the action-if carried to their logical
contracts must be held illegal and not
enforceable in the courts. We are not
surprised, therefore, to find in this case
that the court below held the contract
to be illegal, and the action not maintainable, and that some of themembers
of the Supreme Court were of the same
opinion. The keeping of such houses
is declared a public offense in most of
the States, punishable by confinement
in the penitentiary. Great efforts, by

consequences, mustsuhvertall defenses
against actions founded upon illegal
contracts. But the very point of the
decision seems to us most unquestionable. If the statute against keeping
disorderly brothels is fairly to be construed as allowing such as are not of
that character; and especially if the
municipal authorities may legally, and
in fact, enforce the paymentof a license
duty upon the keepers of such houses;

the philanthropic and the patriotic, in
all countries and all ages, have been put
forth for the suppression of the evil;
and failing in that, to restrict its evil
influences within the narrowest limits,
Butwe are not aware thatany thoughtful mind is becoming more hopeful of
success as time advances. It existed

and again, if such places, by municipal
law or ordinance, are restricted within
prescribedimits,in the towns and cities
thus recognizing their legality within
such bounds, it must follow, that the
owners of household property within
those limits must be allowed to lease
it to the keepers of such places, since
two thousand years ago, in the most they could possibly put It to no other
refined cities of the Roman empire, use, unless they hired parties to carry
and, as we may justly infer, no doubt, on the business, and thus indemnified
from the most expressive insignia
found upon the houses devoted to such
purposes, in the remains of buried
cities, lately excavated, under some
police regulations, probably amounting to a license. It still exists in mod-

themselvesforthe use ot theirproperty
by the returns from such discreditable
traffic. It is in vain to suppose that a
dwelling within the limits thus devoted by the civil authorites to this
scourge of humanity could possibly be

ern France, or did under the empire, applied to any more redeeming or
underthe strictest surveilance and con- creditable use.
sequent allowance of tbcpolice, in most
We need say nothing more upon the
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point that all transactions of an immoral character are not necessarily
illegal. Many countries have supposed themselves compelled to allow an
inferior species of immorality in order
to ptovent a greater. Public wars, the
great source of expenditure, in most
modern nations are indeednothing less
thanwholesale murder, rapine and -obbery, legalized by the authority of the
nations engaged, all which are among
the most flagraut immoralities, as is
well recognized by these same nations.
The English nation have felt compelled to tolerate many practices in their
indan-empire, which could not be
tolerated for a moment in the United
Kingdom. And the slave trade, which
was tolerated by our national eonstitution, was regarded as so far legalized
as to form a valid consideration for contracts.
And the price of slaves in the Slave
States, while slavery existed, was
always recognized as the proper basis
of contracts. And such contracts were
held enforceable in the Free States by
virtue of the clause in theUnited States
constitution recognizing the validity
of slaveproperty. And such contracts,
viz.: for the price of slave labor, or of
the sla' ,e themselves, made within the
Slave States, before slavery was abolIshed, are still held valid and now enforcedble by action at law, even where
slavery does not exist, and is not recognized in any sense. SHAw, Ch. J.,
in Cbmmonwealth v. Ayes, 18 Pick. 193,
198. But a contract made in a foreign
country, based upon the consideration
of slavery or prostitution, or any thing
else not regarded as moral by our law,
although entirely valid by the law of
the country where made, could not be
enforced here, since the maintainance
of actions upon such contracts in our
courts would afford an evil example to
our own citizens. Story's Conflict of
Laws, §§ 257a, 257b, 25, and cases cited.
But there will be no such objection to
allowing actions to be maintained in
our courts upon considerations not
contrary to good morals or sound

policy, provided they are valid where
made, although prohibited by statute
here. Kentucky v. Banford, C. Hill, N.
Y. R. 526. For the decisions against enforcing foreign contracts, in conflict
with the domestic policy of a nation,
see Story (onfl. Laws, § 250 and 6ases
cited. The general subject of illegality
in contracts, with reference to the
cases, will be found somewhat discussed in TewiU v. Bartlett, 21 Vermont
Reports 18. But the very point here
is whether contracts founded upon
considerations recognized by the
statutes of the State where made, can
properly be declaredillegal there on the
ground that such consideration is conIra bonos mores. Lord EMxxBoaoueH
said in Langton v. Hughs, 1 M. and S.
593: "Itmaybetaken asa received rule
of law, that what is done in contravention of an act of Parliament cannot be
made the subject matter of an action."
And we think it safe to affirm that the
converse of the rule is equally true.
If the transaction is clearly recogniz- ed asvalid, and allowable by an express
statute, or if the government lawfully
levy a revenue for license to exercise
the business, the question of it being,
or not being, consistent with good
morals is thereby forestalled, and can.
not be entertained by the court. Some
men consider, in the utmost sincerity
and simplicity, that every sale of spirits
or wine is, ipso facto, immoral, to such
an extent that no statute can legalize
it. If such an one happens to be the
final Judge upon a contract founded upon such a sale, under license fiom the
State, is it competent In such a case for
the Jadge to follow his own sentimentalities upon the subject, in, defiance
of the statute, and declare the contract
void? We think few thoughtful men
will claim any such extreme applica.
tion of the rule contra bonos mores.
And the present case seems to be entirely of that character, in principle,
although far less doubtful in its general character of immorality, aside
from the statute.
LFP.R.
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Supreme Court of Vissouri.
THE STATE OF MISSOURI EX. REL. JAMES H. VAIL V. DANIEL If.
DRAPER, STATE AUDITOR.
The General Assembly has no power to legislate out of office a judge whose
office is created, and whose tenure of office is prescribed by the constitution.
A judge elected by the people of the territoryover which he has jurisdiction
cannot be deprived of his office or authority by transferring his territoryto
other jurisdictions.
And a judge so elected cannot be transferred to, and jurisdiction given to
him over other territory, in which he was not elected, by changing the number
of his circuit or otherwise.
The title of an officer holding an elective office comes from the votes of the
people, and not from his commission, and the mere change of the number of the
circuit for which he is commissioned does not affect his right or title to the
office.

The constitution of Missouri declares that "the judicial
power, as to matters of law and equity, shall be vested in a
Supreme Court, in circuit courts, and in such inferior tribunals as the General Assembly may, from time to time, establish" (Article 6, § 1), and that "the State shall be divided into
convenient circuits, of which the county of St. Louis shall
constitute one, for each of which, except, as in the next succeeding section specified, a judge shall be elected bythequalifled voters of the respective circuits, and except as hereinafter
provided, shall be elected for the term of six years, but may
continue in office until his successor shall be elected and
qualified; and the judge of each circuit, after his election or
appointment, as hereinafter provided, shall reside in and be
a conservator of the peace within the circuit for which he
shall be elected or appointed." (Article 6, § 15.)
The exceptions made in the provisions of the constitution
above quoted are with reference to the county of St. Louis, for
which there are special provisions.
The constitution further declares that "no judicial circuit
shall be altered or changed at any session of the General Assembly next preceding the general election for said judges."
Vail the relator was elected in 1868 judge of a circuit
composed of the counties of Iron, Reynolds, Jefferson and
Washington, which were numbered and designated in his
commission as the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit.
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On the 15th of March, 1872, the General Assembly passed
an act changing the boundaries and increasing the number of
the circuits in the State. In this act the counties of Iron,
Reynolds, Jefferson and Washington are made to constitute
the Twcenty-siith Judicial Circuit. This act further provided
that an election should be held in the Twenty-sixth Judicial
Circuit eajthe 16th day of April, 1872, for a circuit judge.
This election was held, and one Pipkin was elected and coihn
missioned by the Governor of the State as judge of the Twenty,
.,
sixth Judicial. Circuit.
Vail refused t remove into the Fiftheath Judicial Gircfit,
but claimed to be judge of the Twenty-sixth Circuit, and the
State Auditor refusing to draw his warrant for salary, he seud
out this mandamus to compel him to do so.
The other facts of the case sufficientlyappearinthe opinion
of the court, which was delivered by
ADAms J.-This is a petition for a mandamus upon the
State Auditor, to compel him to issue to the relator a warrant
for a quarter's salary, alleged to be due the relatoi as judge
of the Twienty-sixth, formerly Fifteenth, Judicial (ircuit of
this State.
The facts of the case as they appear from the record are a
follows: Under the law as it existed up to the 15th of Marc,
1872, the FVifteenih Judicial Circuit was composed 6f the
counties of Iron, ReynSlds, Washington and Jefferson. A
the general election for judges held in November, A. D. 1868,
the relator was elected judge and commissioned as judge'of
the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit by the governor, and jae
was qualified as such judge under the constitution and la*j
of the State and entered upon his duties as such, and has
continued in possession of the office, discharging its duties'
until the present time.
It further appears from the record that, at the adjourned
session of the Twenty-sixth General Assembly, an act was
passed, and approved the 15th day of .March, 1872, entitled
",An act dividing the State into judicial circuits, prescribing
the time'of holding courts therein, and prdviding for the election of five additional circuit court judges and qircuit .at
VOL- XX.-36.
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torneys," the twenty-seventh section of which act provides
that the Twenty-sixth Judicial Circuit shall consist of the
counties of Jefferson, Washington, Iron and Reynolds. These
counties are the identical counties, and embrace the same territory which constituted the former Fifteenth Judicial Circuit.
Under section sixteen of this act the counties of McDonald,
Jasper, Newton and Lawrence, in the extreme south-west part
of the State, are made to constitute the Fifteenth Judicial
Circuit.
The auditor, as a justification of his refusal of the warrant, sets up the fact that under this act Philip Pipkin was
commissioned as judge of the Twenty-sixth Judicial Circuit,
as created by this act, on the 24th day of April, 1872, as appears by the register of civil officers of the government in
the .office .of Secretary of State.
It will be seen from this statement that the question arising upon this record is, whether the relator, by this act, was
ousted from his office, or, if not ousted, whether he is not
now the judge of the new Fifteenth Circuit, instead of the
present Twenty-sixth Circuit.
I suppose it will not be seriously contended that the Legislature has the power to expel a circuit judge from his office
by a simple act of legislation. This office is created by the
constitution, and as long as there is a circuit over which the
judge may preside, he is entitled to hold his office until the
expiration of his term, if he behaves himself properly.
Whether the Legislature, by abolishing his circuit, can also
abolish his office, is a question not necessarily presented by
this record. The weight of authority, however, seems to be
that the abolition or alteration of the circuit does not abolish
the office. The independence of the judiciary demands that
this should be the case. See Commonwealth v. Gamble, 62
Penn. Rep., 843; Commonwealth v. Mann, 5 Watts &Sergeant,
403 ; People v. Bangs, 23 illinois 547 ; People ex rel Ballou v.
Bangs, 24 Ilhnois, 187; People v. Garey, 6 Cowen 642; 9
Cowan 640; State v. fessmore, 14 Wisconsin 163; Lowe v.
Commonwealth, 3 Metcalf (Ky.) 237; Hook v. Henderson, 4
Deveraux, N. 0. 2; Page v. Hardin, 8 B. Monroe (Ky) 648.
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But the act of the Legislature under consfderation does not
abolish the relator's office, nor does it change or modify his
circuit. It leaves it precisely as it was before, except that
the number by which it was designated is changed from'fifteen to twenty-six. The fourteenth section of the sixth arti.
cle of the constitution provides "that the State shall be divided into convenient circuits, of which the county of St.
Louis shall constitute one, for each of which, except as in the
next succeeding section specified, a judge shall be elected by the
qualified voters of the respective circuits," etc., etc. It is
also provided by the same section thit "no judicial circuit
shall be altered or changed at any session of the General Assembly next preceding the general election for judges."
The next succeding section has relation to the organizationi
of the court, and election, etc., of judges for the Circuit
Court of St. Louis county.
Convenient circuits mean territorial districts, and -not the
names by which each district may be'called. The number.
ing of the districts or circuits is only a convenient mode of
designating them. They might have been designated by giv.
ing them the names of distinguished persons or places, or in
any other mode, so as to distinguish them apart from each
other. The name or number of the circuit constitutes no easential part of it. The entity is the territory bmbrace4
wzithin certain .boundaries, and that remains the same whethet
the name or number be changed or not.
But when the number used in designating the circuit is
also used in the commission issued to the judge withors
inserting the boundaries of his circuit, he is thereby consti.
tuted judge of the territory which elected him. The simple
change of the number designating his territory will not in'
validate his commission as judge ot that territory. He re.
mains judge of the same territory notwithstanding the name
or number .of that territory is changed. It is urged, however, that the simple change of number changes also his territory, and that he must remove to the number indicated by'
his commission, although it may cover territory two hundred
miles distant. If this be true, then the next Legislature may
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change the number again and drive him to another part of
the State, and every succeeding Legislature might do likewise. The Constitution admits of no such construction.
The St. Louis circuit is designated in the commissions of
the St. Louis judges as the Eighth Circuit, and the act of the
Legislature designates the St. Louis Circuit as the eighth in
number. Now, suppose the Legislature, in a new act, was to
call it the tenth and number the existing tenth as the eighth,
would the five judges in St. Louis have to emigrate to find
their circuit, or could they still remain as the judges of that
Farticular territory, notwithstanding its number bad been
changed to the tenth? The absurdity of this carries its refutation on its very face, and yet there is no difference in numlering this circuit and numbering of the others.
The number in either case is only used as a convenient
mode of distinguishing one from anotfier.
Under this view the relator is entitled to his warrant.
The return of the defendant is adjudged insufficient, and a
peremptory mandamus granted.
The other judges concur.
While the conclusion arrived at in
the above opinion is correct beyond
dispute, it is to be regretted that the
court did not more fully and accurately state and discuss the real points involved.
The opinion seems to proceed on the
hypothesis that it was not attempted
by the General Assembly to legislate
Judge Vail out of office. Butthisisthe
very thing which was attempted.
The General Assembly not only
changed the number of his circuit from
the fifteenth to the twenty-slxth, but
actually provided for the -election of
his successor. This was, if the act is
valid, an expulsion of Judge Vail from
the office of judge of the circuit for
which he was elected,
It is no answer to this, even if he
could do so, to say that Judge Vail
could follow the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit to a distant part of the State, and
assert a right under his commission to
hold the office of judge of the new fir-

teenth circuit. This was the theory
upon which the General Assembly
sought to avoid the imputation of attempting to legislate Judge Vail out of
office. But it would be no less an expulsion from office because the General
Assembly was pleased to confer upon
the party thus expelled the judgeship
of another circuit-a thing which it had
no power to do.
The constitution expressly provides
that the judges shall reside in and be
conservators of the peace within the
circuits for which they are elected respectively. This means that they
shall be judges of the circuits in which
they are elected, and cannot be judges
of circuits in which they are not elect.
ed.
The real question then is, can the
General Assembly expel a judge from
office, or deprive him of It by abolish.
ing the same? This the General Assembly attempted to do, as we have
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seen, not only by changing the number
of the circuit, but by providing for the
Diction of another Judge.
. To determine this question, in this
State, it is only necessary -to consider
theplain provisions oftheconstitutlon.
.Indeed'it is difficult to contemplate a
government with three independent
Co-ordinate departments,.with one department so completely at the mercy

of another, as the Judiciary would be
if the General Assembly could idopt
such measures 0s the one under consideration. We -rejoice that in this
State, as in all others In which the
same question has arisn, our highest
judicial tribunal bas" boldly asserted
the independence of the judiciary.
H. B. Joaxsoi.

United States District Court, Eastern District of 1Wiscoi7s'n.
THE LAC LA BELLE.
A steam vessel having complied with the act of February 28, 1871, and the
rules of the Board of Supervising Inspectors, and the Secretary of the Treasury,
*by placing on board a register adopted by said board and Sec etary, which is
Insufficlernt, is not liable to ielzure for having in use an imperfect register rquiring frequent repairs.

This was a libel of information brought by the District
Attorney, charging that said steamer having and carrying
passengers on board, did navigate Lake Michigan between
the port of Grand Haven in the State of Michigan and the
.port of Milwaukee in the State of Wisconsin in violation of
the second subdivision of section eleven of the act of Congres5, entitled "An act to provide for the better security of
life on board of vessels propelled in whole or in part by
steam, and for other purposes"-approved Feb. 28, 1871, in
this that said steamer had not been provided with a steam
registering gauge as required by said act and by the rules
-and regulations adopted and prescribed by the boardl of
supervising inspectors under and pursuant to said act. And
a penalty of five hundred dollars was claimed, for the pay.
ment of which this steamer -was seized.
Levi Hubbell, District Attorney.
Finches; Lynde & HAiller for claimants.
MILLER, D. J.-The said second subdivision of the act
(Statutes at Large, 444) among other things directs that the
inspectors shall satisfy themselves that there are on each
steam. vessel, "to indicate the pressure of steam, suitable
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steam registers, that will correctly record each excess of
steam carried above the prescribed limit and the highest
point attained, which shall be taken wholly from the control
of all persons engaged in navigating such vessel, and secured
by the inspectors, provided, however, that no kind of instrument, machine or equipment for the better security of life
provided for by this act shall be used by any such vessel,
which shall not first be approved by the board of supervising
inspectors and also by the Secretary of the Treasury." Pursuant to this provision of the act, the board of supervising
inspectors of steam vessels and the Secretary of the Treasury
adopted and prescribed rules and regulations, and names of certain instruments, machines and equipments. Rule 95-" All
steam registers required by law shall not be allowed to use
any card, paper or dial for recording the pressure and its
variations which shall need renewal oftener than once in
And among the instruments,
every twelve months."
machines and equipments adopted is the recording steam
gauge of E. H. Ashcrafts, of Boston.
The answer of claimants alleges that at and before the
time of the seizure of the said steamer she had on board and
in use, according to the requirements of said act of Congress,
a recording steam gauge or register known and distinguished
as E. H. Ashcrafts' of Boston, Massachusetts, which steam
register had theretofore been approved and was then approved
by the board of supervising inspectors of steam vessels for
the United States and the Secretary of the Treasury; and respondent alleges that it has complied with the provisions of
said act of Congress according to its true intent and meaning.
The Asherafts register is proven to be on board this steamer,
at the time she was seized. The seizure was made on the
ground that this register was defective in its construction, and
did not comply with the requirements of the Act of Congress,
and rule 95 above quoted. The registers required by the act
are to be located out of the reach of the officers of the steamboat, and in view of the passengers. They are to be under
the control and subject to the examination of the inspectors.
And by the rule, registers shall not be used which need renewal oftener than once in twelve months. It is proven sat-
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isfactorily that the register in this steamer had been in use
for a short time and was found to be out of order. It was
repaired by the manufacturer, and returned and was put up
again. On examination it was found again out of order, and
the register device refused to operate as required by law.
The registering apparatus failed to perform its functions.
The register pointer would move forward on an excess of
pressure, and again on the return of the excess of pressure
the pointer would move back to the point from which it
started; while it should have remained at the point to which
the pressure forced it in the excess of steam. The return of
the pointer left no indication that there had been an excess
of steam. If the difficulty was removed it would record each
excess of steam up to ninety excesses, ninety times, and then
it would fail to operate until re-set or re-adjusted. This could
not be done without the inspector having access to it, as the
law requires the government inspector to lock the register
and keep it locked, and no one else to have access to it. The
.ninety excesses might be made within one week's time, or
even less. This register would not be sufficient to run on
this steamer for twelve months without repairing, and there
'would be no certainty in the ordinary use of the instrument
of its coming anywhere near the requirements of the law.
The A.lhcrafts register is generally defective in its construction, and has not sufficient registering capacity to last twelve
months.
For these reasons a certificate of sufficiency of the register
used on this steamer was refused by the inspector, and the
vessel was seized.
It is evident to me from an examination of the testimony,
that the steamer is not in fault, and that she cannot be adjudged liable to the penalty demanded. The claimant procured at his own expense a register apprbved by the lawful
authority, and on its failure it was repaired at his expense.
It is a well-settled principle that the citizen shall not be
adjudged guilty of willful neglect of duty, or of violation of
law, while faithfully submitting to the judgments or orders
of officers of lawful authority. Citizens are not responsible
for mistakes of government officers.
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This case raises some doubts of the fulfilment of the requirements of the act of Congress, by the registers accepted,
but some register may be produced by the ingenuity of man
that may answer the purpose of the act. Owners of steamboats are not to be required to procure at their own expense
all the registers adopted by the board of supervising inspectors. They comply with the law by purchasing and trying
one of the adopted registers, and they should not be mulcted
in a penalty for the insufficiency of the one -purchased.
The libel of information must be dismissed.

Supreme Court of Mfichigan.
MILTON I.

BUTLER V. JAMES A. ROYS et al.

Where an inheritance conbists of several distinct freeholds, a tenant in com.
mon may convey his undivided interest in any one or more of them, and it may
be sold on execution without reference to any of the other parcels.
Where such an inheritance or estate consists of separate city lots which have
been platted, each lot is presumed to be a separate holding, in the absence of
evidence showing such a combined use, or such a subjection to some common
lease or charge as would make them in fact one freehold, and make it impossibl1 to sever them without injustice.

Error to Circuit Court for Wayne county.
Joseph Campan having died seized of a large number of
parcels of land of different values, in Wayne county and
elsewhere, and having left nine children as equal heirs, the
interest of one of them, Theodore J. Campan, was sold on
execution, not levied on such interest in all the lands in
Wayne county, but on four separate city lots in Detroit, and
the interest in each lot was sold separately. On a partition
among the heirs, to which the purchasers were not made
parties, these lots were set off to other heirs, and not to Theodore. The execution purchasers brought this action of ejectment for their undivided interest in these lots.
John J. $peed, E. 1Wr ifeddaugh, G. . N. Lathrop and
R. P. Toms for plaintiff in error.
. Larned, D. B. & I. if. Duffield, H. if. Cheever and
Chas. I. Wfalker for deibndant.

DUTLER V. ROS

The opinion of the court was delivered by
CA PBELL, J.-The suit is defended on the ground that the
execution sales were invalid, because covering parts and not all
of the estate in common.
The question presented here was urged, but not decided,
in certain suits in equity brought to set aside the execution
sales. Campan v. Godfrey, 18 Mich. 27. It now becomes
necessary to decide it, as disposing of the substantial rights
of all parties concerned.
There are more dicta than decisions upon the precise point
in litigation here, and we have rarely found a matter of so
much importance on which so much has been carelessly said,
and so much inferred without adequate authority. It is
nevertheless important to have the rights of parties settled finally, and we have done what we could, with the
aid of counsel, to satisfy our own minds on the subject. And
upon the exact dispute involved here we have, at least so far
as our views are concerned, got rid of the very serious doubts
which seemed at first to involve the doctrines of the law in
great conusion.
The principal controversy is not whether a tenant in common can convey his interest by metes and -bounds in a part
of an estate, but whether all of the various tenements held in
common in a State, county or other municipal teiritory, are
to be regarded as one estate in common for all jurposes of
conveyance and partition. And this is'the only qufestion
which we are required to pass upon in this controversy.
The lots in question in these actions of ejectment all belong
to the Governor and Judges' Plan of the City of Detroit, and
sre separate freeholds. lo one of them appears to have been
so combined with any other as to make them one indivisible
holding by separate occupancy, by lease for a single and unapportioned rent, by subjection to a single charge, or in any
other way. And there is nothing to show that the possession of any one of them is necessary to the enjoyment of any
other. The case is, therefore, presented very simply, and involves no peculiar complications.
The ground on which it is claimed no tenant in common
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can pass an individual interest in any less that the whole es.
tate is that, by doing so, he prevents his co-tenant from any
chance of obtaining the whole of the lesser tract in severalty,
as they might otherwise do, in case a partition should be had.
In other words, he limits their chances of getting entire lots
to a smaller number of parcels, and may make it necessary
for them to get a number of little tracts, instead of one or
more larger ones.
This is a tangible grievance, and may become a very serious one. The only question for us to consider is, whether it is
an interference with any legal right.
It will be found that the decisions holding or favoring this
doctrine are all American, and all rely for authority upon the
leading cases in Massachusetts. The few English decisions
on which these latter rely (Tooker's case. 2 Co. 62 and Oro.
Eliz. 803 being the principal ones) are not decisions upon the
subject, but only hold that joint tenants and tenants in common can do nothing to lawfully prejudice the estates of their
co-tenants. They do not any of them hold, so far as we have
been able to discover, that where there are several distinct
freeholds or estates, a disposal of an undivided interest in one
of them would work a legal prejudice. And it is only unlawful acts which can do this. The whole ruling, therefore, is
an assumption, unless founded on more specific authority,
and must depend on controlling reason, or must be considered as open to question. It will be seen by a close inspection,
that while the point involved in the case before us has been
spoken of with some positiveness, there has been very little
occasion to decide it.
There a
Porterv. Hill, 9 Mass. 84, is the leading case.
who
morttenants,
sold
to
joint
had
been
of
land
single tract
parcels
smaller
gaged it back for the purchase money. The
in which undivided interests were transferred were carved
out of this estate, and the entire estate became vested in the
grantor of the defendant. The case was decided without
either citation of authorities or reasoning, the whole doctrine
being laid down in these two sentences: "And one joint tenant cannot convey a part of the land, by metes and bounds,
to a stranger. If he could, his grantee would become tenant
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in common of a particular part without the other join t tenant,
who in making a legal partition might notwithstanding'have
the whole of the part thus conveyed assigned as his property." This brief assertion, in a case where there was but
one estate and where it was a correct rule, has been made the
'starting point for all the decisions in the country, so far as
they have been traced out, leading to a broader doctrine.
The next case was Bartlett v. Harlow, 12 Mass. 348, where
there had been a levy by extent upon an interest in twenty
acres out of a single tract of sixty acres. In this case, while
it is said there is an absence of common-law authority to
sustain such a transfer, and while an explanation is made of
certain remarks of Lord COKE as not fairly bearing such a construction as would favor it, the only unequivocal authorityis one
cited from Brownlow, which very distinctly holds that where
there are several estates there may be separate sales. Porter
v. Hill is affirmed and its reasoning somewhat expanded, and
it is intimated finally that'the transfer might become operative, if on partition the land it covered fell to the defendant
in execution. That case, then, is not in point beyond the
force of its reasoning, if referring to different freeholds. It
was not at all like this case, because a single estate was involved and no more.
Farnurnv. Abbott, 12 Mass. 490, was a case where it does
not appear there was more than one estate, though there
were several conveyances of undivided interests by the several tenants in common in separate portions of- it. No question was decided in that case beyond the validity of the
conveyances as against the grantors, which was maintained.
It was held, however, that separate. actions were necessary
against the disseizors of the various parts under those conveyances-a doctrine which is certainly sound, but puts the
co-tenants to the very trouble the main doctrine in the former
cases was apparently designed to prevent.
In Baldwin v. Whiting, 13 Mass. 57, the premises consisted of one tract, and the case was decided on the previous
authorities. The same is true of Blossom v. Brightman, 21
Pick. 283, 285. In Nichols v. Smith, 22 Pick. 316, there was
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no decision on the question at all, the deed being held good
against the parties to the suit.
Peabody v. Ifinot, 24 Pick. 329, is the first case involving
different parcels, and no question was raised or discussed in
the argument concerning any difference between the transfer
of interest in one of several estates and in parts of a single
estate. But in this case the court held practically that aa
interest in one of two distinct estates could be sold. The inheritance consisted of two parcels in Methuen, and four in
Bradford, the latter being parts of one farm. It does not
appear whether the lands in the two towns had been used together or not. The lands in iMethuen and three of the small
parcels in Bradford were assigned for dower. The court held
the dower lands should be considered as a separate estate,
and might be dealt with by themselves, without reference to
the rest, which were not subject to dower; but held also that
a transfer of an undivided interest in a specific portion of the
dower lands was bad.
That decision, which is the only Massachusetts case we
have found directly in point, seems opposed to the doctrine
that undivided interests in distinct freeholds cannot be. sold
separately. In Miller v. Miller, 13 Pick. 237, the decision
seems to rest on the same grounds. There a tenant in common
asked partition of a mill-dam and its appurtenances, and it
was refused on the sole ground that it was part of a single
freehold. The court say: "We decide the ease on the gr9und
that the mill, dam, logways, water privileges and appurtenances constitute one entire tenement or holding of a freehold
estate, and therefore the petition, being for a partition of the
dam and water above, cannot be sustained. It is a well settled
rule of law that a tenant in common cannot enforce partition
of a part of the common tenement by metes and bounds."
And they said separating mill and dam would destroy the
estate.
Adam v. The Briggs Tron Co., 7 Cush. 360, held that the
minerals and the soil could not be dealt with separately by a
tenant in common, a question similarly decided in New Jersey in Boston Franklinite C'. v. Condit, 4 Green Eq. 394.
In Exparte Bonner, 4 Jfass. 122, it was held, at a very early
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day, that two parcels in different counties could not be parti.
tioned together, because not in one venue. Yet such parcels
might be joined in one border farm.
The decisions referred to, however broad their intimations
may be, do not operate as binding precedents for any doctrin applicable to cases where there are distinct freeholds.
And as they do not profess to rest on either English or
American precedents, going to any such extent, they cannot
absolve us from the necessity of considering the questions
on common-law principles.
A somewhat careful investigation of cases cited and some
not cited, in Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Connecticut,
New Jersey, Maryland, Tennessee and Virginia, while it
shows that the Massachusetts decisions underlie them all, and
in many instances are asserted as maintaining the broadest
doctrines, shows further that in not more than five or Aix
cases reported from all those States, so far as we can gather,
was any question really in issue beyond rights in single tenures. And except from the cases cited they got no real support from any adjudications. They all rest on the theory of
prejudice to the rights of co-tenants, and they generally allow
the deeds to operate by estoppel.
In Ohio, however, the rights of tenants in common are
left almost unlimited, since the case of White v. ,Sayre, 2
Hammond 110. And in some other States the distinction is
recognized expressly between single and detached freeholds.
In Starr v. Leavitt, 2 Conn. 243, it was held improper to
levy an extent on an undivided interest in two parcels, when
an undivided interest in one would have satisfied the claim.
The Massachusetts doctrine in regard to subdividing single
parcels was nevertheless recognized and has always been
followed.
So in Maryland, in Carrollv. Norwood,." H. & J. 167, it was
held that a single tract could not be cut up under a sale of
undivided interests in parcels of it, but if the parties had
themselves platted it into parcels an interest might then bq
sold to any one of them. The same rule is recognized in
Rienecker v. Smith, 2 H. &J. 421.
So in Missouri, in Primm v. Walker, 38 Mo. 94, it was
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held that platting lots for sale made separate estates of them,
and interests in each might be conveyed.
In a majority of the States no discussion has arisen upon
this particular question. From a review of the cases cited
on the argument or which have come to our notice, the distinction is, we think, maintained on the real weight of authority, confining this term to actual decisions and not dicta.
But inasmuch as it cannot be denied there has been a vague
idea, in many quarters, that there was something especially
improper in disposing of undivided rights in parts of an
inheritance, it will be of some importance perhaps to consider how far this notion has any legal foundations. And as
the only expressed reason for the judicial statements referred
to is the prejudice done to the co-tenants this must be taken
into account in the outset. And we are required to consider
what is to be regarded as such prejudice as will preclude
the dispositions referred to.
It cannot be true that every act which has a tendency to
interfere with the supposed interest of others is forbidden,
merely because some such tendency may be imagined to
exist. No right of property can depend on the floating and
unregulated opinions of courts or juries. No legal right can
be cut off on any such pretence. Unless the law of the land
has made an interest in land unassignable, no court, either of
law or of equity, has any power to forbid it, conits of equity
cannot override the law any more than other courts. Every
court must respect the rights lawfully obtained by transfer
from tenants in common. And the original resort to equity
is declared and settled in England to be a matter of absolute
right, in every case where partition could be had at law, and
in no other case except as to equitable estates. It is the
legal right which gives jurisdiction over the legal estate.
Baring v. Nash, 1 V. &B. 551 ; Parker v. Gerard,Ambl. 236;
Turner v. Horgan. 8 Yes. 143.
It is held, also, that the right is so absolute that, although
its enforcement would lead to the most absurd, oppressive
and ruinous results, the court was powerless to resist it.
Equity had no inherent jurisdiction to order sales, and where
the number of interests was large, or the paccel to be divided
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small, or difficult of division, the division must be made in
spite of the difficulty or hardship. Equity can, no doubt, do
justice as to many collateral rights and incidents, which could
not be regulated under the writ of partition, and can deal
with numerous interests and estates, but the jurisdiction, as
before stated, is one which cannot be refused to any legal
owner. And by the former English practice the action of
the commissioners could not be overruled by the court for
inequality. Manners v. Charlesworth,1 Myl. & K. 330. Turner
v. Morgan, 8 Ves. 145, is an illustration of this. Partition
was there sought of a house, complainant owning two-thirds,
and defendant, who was in possession, one-third. The chancellor, seeing that a division would. be ruinous, held the case
over for some time that the parties might come to 'an agreement. But this failing, it was said that the rule was compulsory, and he reluctantly granted a decree. The result appears in a note to 11 Ves. 157 which is as follows: "The
end of that case was, that the commission having ben executed, an exception was taken by the defendant, on .theground
that the commissioners had allotted to the plaintiff the whole
stock of chimneys, etc., all the fire-places, the only staircase
in the house, and all the conveniences in the yard. Upon the
1st of August, 1804, the exception was overruled. The lord
chancellor said he did not know how to make a better partition for the parties; that he granted the commission with
great reluctance, but was bound by authority; -and it must
be a strong case to induce the court to interpose, as the parties
ought to agree to buy and sell. In Parker v.'Gerard,Ambl.
236, where the interest of the party was so small he would
have preferred relinquishing it, he was compelled to make
partition, and, according to the rule then in force, to payan
equal share of the expense. There are some further cases
collected in the notes .to Agar v. Fairfax,2 Lead Ca. in
Equity 3-9 & seq., and in the notes to I]undy v. Ifundy, 1
Belt's Supp. 236, 7.
The difficulties which have occurred in practice have been
very serious, and the mischief done by unlimited transfers.
and sub-divisions of undivided interests has been quite as
prejudicial as any dealing with interests in detached lots could
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be. The remedy hinted at by Lord EDOx and by other
chancellors was resort to a sale. Our law has always permitted this, when property was not divisible without mischief; and we have never had any such monstrous results as
appeared in Turner v. Morgan. We are not informed whether
this power existed when the law was settled in Massachusetts. It completely removes all the imaginary hardships
there suggested. It may be said, indeed, that the tenants
would prefer lands, and have a right to them. But this principle must be general, and apply as well to small as to large
estates; and then the power to insist on division is, as plainly
stated by Lord MACCLESFIELD, in Earlof Clarendon & Bligh
v. Ilornby, 1 P. Wms. 447, a power to extort an exorbitant
price from the party desiring the estate. The statute does
not permit any such grasping and selfish policy, and, as all
parties can bid if they choose, they can always get the worth
of the land, if not the land itself. The prejudice is now, at
least, very difficult to be appreciated.
In England the result of their old experience has been the
passage, in 1868, of an act not only permitting a sale, in any
case where it seems necessary, but absolutely requiring it in
all cases where one-half in interest request it, unless the opposing parties will buy, and it has been allowed on behalf of
infants and married women, as well as others. Iiggs v.
Dorkis, L. R.13 Eq. 280; Francev. France,Id. 173. In Pinkerton v. Barnes L. R. 6 Chancery Appeals 685, decided in
July, 1871, the lord chancellor applied this statute to a very
great estate, including a first-class mansion and park of 300
acres, farming lands of 3,000 acres, and a manor extending
over about thirty square miles. He makes some very sensible remarks upon the sentimental view of the question which
seems to have been taken by the vice chancellor, which are
not inapplicable to such cases as this. "The vice chancellor
then urges, as a reason against a sale, that the two part
owners come from a common ancestor, and that the testator
gave the estate to them as land.
No doubt he gave it as land;
but he gave it to them absolutely, and there was nothing to
prevent them from disposing of it as they thought fit. Consequently, I do not see that its coming from a common
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ancestor makes any great difference." p. 694. We must look
then to ascertain whether there is any such legal incapacity
as is asserted, for in this equity only follows the law.
It would be of more antiquarian than practical interest to
discuss at large the old English doctrines in regard to parti'
tions and undivided estates. The decisions are consistent
in denying any right to divide such estates, large or small,
as involve single rents, services or other elements of difficulty.
Copyholds and customary estates cannot be partitioned at all,
even by courts, except, possibly, under the recent Statutes
of Victoria. Allnutt on Partition 136. And there are many
cases where nothing but the wide discretion of equity can
enable a division to be made without great inconvenience.
But upon the question whether estates can be dealt with
by parties separately, there is, we think, no absence of authority. The doctrine is not unknown.
In all the cases which have arisen, so far as we have been
able to trace anything on the subject, the dispute has been,
not whether estates could be partitioned separately, but.
whether they must not always be partitioned so. And Judge
STORY, in his Chapter on Partition, 1 Eq. Jur. § 646- and seq.,
shows it to be one of the chief advantages of equity over
law that it is not compelled to subdivide each parcel. At
common law there could be no allowance made for oweltv
or equality of partition, except by agreement of the
parties; and every parcel must be subdivided into as many
fragments as there were owners, unless they all happened to
be of equal value, which could seldom happen, while no cas
has been discovered, in any of the English law books, in,
any way questioning the right to deal separately with sepa-_
rate freeholds, the variations from that practice are recorded
usually with their reasons, and as deviations from custom.
The doctrine that on a partition of different estates they
may be allotted severally and without subdivisions, is traced
back to an authority cited in Brooke's Abridgment from the
Year Books. The statutes of Henry VIII., which gave to
tenants in common and joint tenants the rights of partition,
merely extended to them the common law writ de partitione
facienda, as it had always been given to coparceners, ana
VOL. x. -37.
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made no changein its operation. The language (merely mod-..
ernized in spelling) is "in like manner and form as coparteners by the common laws of the realm have been and are.
compellable to do, and the same Writ to be pursued at the
common law." Act 31 H. 8. c. 1. The authority in Brooke
was a case of quare impedit concerning the presentment of
an advowson. A widow having dower in several tenements
and manors, the sheriff, under a writ, assigned to her in entirety one manor and advowson. It was claimed she should
have been endowed of a third of each, but two of the judges
held against one that the assignment was good. LITTLETON
enlarged somewhat upon the matter, and gave illustrations.
He says: "If a man has two manors, and elegit is sued against
him, the sheriff may deliver him one manor; and likewise in
writ de partitionefacienda,where there are two parceners and
two manors, the sheriff may assign the .one to one, and the
otlier manor to the other; and likewise in dower of three
acres, or three manors, he may assign one acre or one manor
to the wife for the whole." Brooke's Abr. Dower 72 (12
Ed.4. 2.), This same citation occurs in two other placesonce under "Elegit 14," and once under "Partition 29" in
both of which it is qualified by the condition that the manors
shall be"of equal values. (Treen videtur quod hoc intelligitur
ou ils sont de equal values, et eadem de ii acres.) This qualification is recognized throughout; Allnut on Partition 50 ; Vi.
ner's Ab. Partition A 4; and is necessary, because under the
writ of partition there was no provision for equalizing shares.
On voluntary partitions this was frequently done by a rent
charge on the larger, in aid of the smaller tenements assigned,
or by occupying the several manors in alternate years. Fitz.
N; B. 62 K.; Litt. § 251. 252. Co. Lit. 165a. The writ was
designed to compel refractory tenants into a partition, and in
a majority of cases the division was made without a writ, by
such means as seemed proper. The commonest methods are
mentioned by Littleton, § 243-4-5, and seq. and taken from him
with explanations by most of the writers on real estate. Co.
Lit. 166a. 2 Cr. Dig. 394-5. This may account for the meager information on the subject of enforced partition to be
fofmnd ip the books, complained of by the English as well as
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by the American Courts. (See remarks of the Chancell or in
.fanners v. Charlesworth, 1 Myl. and K. 330.) Much of the
discussion in the early writers is upon the validity of these
voluntary partitions, which were sustained as far as possible.
Equality of value alone was not enough to maintain an
allotment to each of two tenants in common of a separate estate in entirety. They must have been held by similar titles.
If one was held in fee simple, and one ii fee tail, there coald
be no such allotment, and each had to be subdivided because
a partition at common law did not bind future estates. Co.
Lit. 173.
The statutes relating to writs of elegit did not in terms require the sheriff to give an undivided half of the debtor's
lands, but simply a half in value, and, as usually interpreted,
by metes and bounds. The practice seems generally, however, to have been to give only half of the several tenements
extended, and the citation from Brooke refers to this. In
Doed. Taylor v. Lord Abingdon, Doug. 473, the question was

raised whether the sheriff might not deliver so many separate
tenements, without division, as would equal in value onehalf of All the lands of the debtor, and it was held he could
do so, Lord MANSFIELD remarking on the inconvenience of
dividing a great number of parcels. It is said in a note, as.
well as in the argument, that there is some confusion as to"
what had been the construction of the statute. And it appears also that a division would be necessary, unless the half
in value could be got at without it. But the whole course
of reasoning is against encumbering more parcels than should
be necessary by such a levy, and would apply to a levy on
undivided estates as well as others. We find no English
decisions directly touching such a case, but the Connecticut
case of Starr v. Leavitt, 2 Conn. 243, is in-point, and rests on
the same principles.
The first case in equity which we have discovered, in which
a partition was sought without dividing each of the estates,
is'Earlof Clarendon and Bligh v. Hornby,P. Wms 447, where
the defendant insisted very strenuously that the common law
rule must be followed. Lord MACCLESFIELD, however, held
that it was in the power of the court to allot entire parcels,
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and directed the commissioners to give the mansion and
principal estate to the complainants, only assigning to Hornby
lands to the full value of his one-third interest.
In Bartlett v. Harlow mention is made of an early ease in
Browlow 157, which it is admitted establishes the right of a
tenant in common to sell his interest in any freehold; but it
is intimated that he mentions no name nor date of the case
in question, nor any other particulars, from which we might
learn whether there was anything peculiar in the circumstances, or whether the point now in question was considered by
the court; and they proceed to say that a single case, thus
loosely reported, is entitled to very little consideration, when
it appears to be in any degree inconsistent with the general
principles of the law applicable to the subject. As the only
case cited in opposition, which has any bearing on the sub
ject, is Porterv. Hill, the criticism is somewhat peculiar, and,
so far as it relates to accuracy of statement, it is entirely un
founded. The case is stated very minutely, and the exact
point decided is so plain that no one could mistake it. It is
taken from Viner's Abridgement, "Partition L. 15," and ap.
pears in that work as undisputed law; and it is so laid down
in the modern work of Mr. Allnutt, who cites the case in
three different places. Allnutt on Partition, 37, 60, 61. The
statement is as follows:
"Thirteen men joined in a purchase of a manor. The conveyance was of a moiety to one of them in fee, and the
other moiety to the other twelve in fee. The twelve
made a feoffment to J. S. of twelve several tenements and
lands, and J. S. made twelve several feoffments to those
twelve; now the thirteenth man, who had the other moiety,
brought one writ of partition against them all, pretending that
they held insimul etpro indiviso; and by the opinion of the
whole court it would not lie, but he ought to have brought
several writs."
It is not strange, perhaps, that the common law rules should
be unfamiliar, for even in England a question was raised but
a few years ago in Hanbary v. Hssey, 15 Jurist 596, whether
a manor could be divided at all.
In Rutherford v. Jones, 14 Georgia 521, a bill in equity was
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filed as the only supposed means of obtaining a partition
without dividing every parcel held in common, and the
courts seem to have accepted the doctrine as true at common
law, but said that there was a statute passed at a very early
day in that State during the last century which allowed entire
lots to be set off at law; and on that account the bill was dismissed, and the party remanded to his writ. In Georgia the
-remedy in equity appears to have been confined to cases not
cognizable at law.
So the House of Lords in .enzies v. Macdonald,S6 E. IL. &
Eq. 20, dealt with a case where a land holder, having a common interest in a lake bordering his estate, disposed of a part
of his lands, and as appurtenant thereto of a part interest in
the lake to be used in common with all the other owners, who
claimed no such partial interest in common could be conveyed.
But on general principles, and without any suggestion of
difference between English and Scottish law on the subject,
it was held there could be no objection to it. The case is not
directly, in point, and is not authority, but its language is
significant.
I Judge STORy, in his commentaries, lays down the doctrine
that, while at law it is possible that in some cases whole
estates may be allotted without division, yet "it is obvious that,
at law,. such a partition can rarely be conveniently made, because the court cannot decree compensation, so as to make up
forany inequality which must ordinarily occur in the allotment
of different estates to each party." 1 Story, Eq. Jur. § 657. In
the preceding section, 656 c. it is stated that "courts of equity, in making these adjustments, will not confine themhelves
to the mere legal rights of the original tenants in common,
but will have regard to the legal and equitable rights of all
other parties interested in the estate, which have been derived from any of the original tenants in common; and will,
if necessary for this purpose, direct a distinct partition of
each of the several portions of the estate, in which the derivative alienees have a distinct interest, in order to protect
that interest. The case referred to as an illustration is
Story v. Johnson, 1 Y. & Col. Exch. 538, 2 Id. 586, where one
of three tenants in common holding each an undivided
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third interest in two estates, convyed his interest in one
estate to one grantee, and in the other estate to another grantee, and the court compelled both estates to be divided, each
into three parts, so that each of those grantees should
enjoy his title.
So in Brace v. Foulces, 16 Jurist 738, a tenant in common was allowed to file a claim for partition of a specific part
of certain property, having no interest in the remainder, although a bill was already pending for a partition of the whole,
which had not yet been brought to a hearing; and the vice
chancellor not only entertained the bill but refused to compel
the complainant to await the proceedings in the suit for the
entire estate.
The courts, then, do not hesitate to recognize the right to
make such sales.
Not only is our law regulating partitions based on the idea
that a sale, instead of being a calamity to be avoided at all
*hazards, will always be more just than an unequal partition,
" but it must be construed with reference to other laws. Lands
have no such fixed rental value here as in England, and when
a creditor has claims, we require a sale instead of the ancient
*extent. If a creditor, no matter what may be the size of his
debt, is compelled to levy on an undivided interest in a whole
inheritance, he must, in cases like the present, where the value
amounts to millions of dollars, either make an excessive levy
or take an infinitesimal share in some hundreds of parcels. It
is easy enough to see that property would not bring its value
on such a sale, and that the procedure would not tend to simplify partitions; while it would almost inevitably lead to
fraud and collusion against the purchaser in settling the terms
of partition, by decree or by agreement.
If lands have been treated as separate parcels for one purpose, there is no sense in holding them inseparable for another.
The presumption must always be that lots which are purchased by separate deeds or described in plats as separate may
:be safely treated as continuing separate, unless so rented or oc.
cupied or otherwise charged as to render it improper thus to
regard them. The law may do, safely and justly, what the
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*parties do themselves, whatever may be the size of the freehold.
This has been the common practice of the counfry, and,
whatever may have been our undefined notions on the subje~t, they have seldom prevented lawyers or laymen from
dealing with interests in city lots or other district parcels,
without inquiring whether they are held in comion with
other detached lands. Our tax-laws have always been frxrheld
on this plan, and the practice has not been found dangerous.
But with the policy, whether good or bad, we have no concern when parties rest on legal rights. We think the rigt
of sale exists in each distinct freehold, and cannot be divest~a
by legal discretion.
Cases are constantly arising where estates once separate become united into one holdifkg, and when so united they may
cease to be distinct freeholds. Where various adjacent 16is
are leased together for a rent or subject to a burden incapable of apportionment on any recognized basis for each lot, .or
where a hotel or other single building covers several lots, oT
where they are used together for a mill or factory, or other
enterprise, or where various parcels are consolidat ed into onp
farm or made subservient to it, and so used, there- can be no
difficulty in determining by the terms of the charge or 'by
the possession itself, their unity of occupation; and a puichaser with that notice buys at his peril. Such cases aT
easily recognized, and will be readily dealt with on their-. wn
facts and merits. If an estate is really single, it will be protected against any acts in prejudice of the owners. And, on
the same principle, as held in the case from Missouri, if parties subdivide an entire estate into distinct and separate parcels, with the plain design of treating them as separate, it can
make no difference that the separate holdings were once
united, or that the divisions were not extensive.
The execution purchasers of the interests of Theodore Campan took valid legal estates, and have a right to enforce themi
at law, as well as in equity. They are not bound by the partition proceedings, because they were not made parties. If
Theodore Campan,by the disregard ofthese sales, received on te
partition a larger share than he was entitled to, that must be ar-
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ranged between him and those who lose interests in the parcels sold on execution. The case of Dacre v. Gorges, 2 Sim.
& St. 454, indicates how such compensation is secured under
the English practice; but as no such interference is necessary
to protect the purchasers on execution, we are not called upon
in this case to consider what the proper method may be.
The judgment in each of the causes brought up must be
reversed with costs and a new trial granted.

Common Pleas of Summit County, Ohio.
JOHN R. PENN, TRUSTEE, V. THE ATLANTIC AND GREAT WESTERN RAILWAY COMPANY AND OTIERS.
A court of equity has power to decree a foreclosure of a junior mortgage and
a sale of the mortgaged property thereunder subject to the outstanding lien of
&senlox mortgage.
The S74 section of the Code of Civil Proceedings of Ohio does not interfere
with theexercise of such power.
f, The right in equity to redeem the mortgaged property belongs to every per.
,on who has a legal or equitable lien on the same, provided he comes in as privy
LInestate with the mortgagor.
'Where a junior incumbrancer pays the amount due on a prior incumbrance,
he is entitled to be subrogated to the rights of such prior incumbrancer as
* anst the mortgagor.
But where the Interest only upon the debt steured by the prior mortgage is
due, and the same is paid by a subsequent mortgagee, his lien upon the mort.
Mtged property,which results from such payment, will be postponed to the pay-mrentof the residue of the prior mortgage debt.

:.: Aforrison 1R. Waite, William W. .AacFarland and Sher.
lock J. Andrews for the plaintiff.
Rufus P. Ranney and Otis & Adams for the first mortgage
trustees.
Wn. H. Upson for himself.
The opinion of the court was delivered by

BOYNTON, J.-Previous to 1865 the Atlantic and Great
Western Railroad Company of Ohio was a corporation-the
owner of a railroad running from Dayton, Ohio, to the western
-ine of Pennsylvania. The Atlantic and Great Western Railroad of Pennsylvania was a corporation-the owner of a
railroad running from the eastern terminus of the first mentioned railroad to the eastern line of Pennsylvania. The

PENN V. RAILWAY COMPANY.

Atlantic and Great Western Railroad Company of New York
was a corporation whose road ran from the. eastern terminus
.of said Pennsylvania Railroad to Salamanco in the State of
New York. The Buffilo extension of the Atlantic and Great
Western Railroad Company was a corporation-:-the owner of
a railroad running from Salamanco to Buffalo in the State of.
New York. In September, 1865, these four companies, in
pursuance of the laws of the aeveral States under which they
were respectively incorporated, and by agreement among
themselves, consolidated into 9ne corporation under the coi.
porate name of the Atlantic 'and Great Western Railway
Company; and.theretipoi all the rights, privileges and franChaises of each of the origijal corporations, all the property,
real, personal and mixed, and all debts due and owing on
whatever account, as well as siock subscriptions and other
things in action ind possession belonging to each, were transkerred to and vested in the Atlantic and Great Western Rail.
way Company, the new corporation. On the other hand, all
"rights of creditdrs, all liend upon the prbperty of the merged
,companies existing at the time of the consolidation, remained
in full force and attached to the new one in which they
were thus merged. The latter, therefore, succeeded to .the
franchises and became charged with the obligations and duties
of the former and of each of them.
On the first day of July, 1855, the Atlantic and Great
Western Railroad Company of Ohio excuted to Azariah C.
Vlagg and Charles J. Steadman, trustees, a mortgage deed of
all it's property, real, personal and mixed, acquired and to be
acquired, to secure the payment of bonds then issued by said
company,'of which there are now outstanding in the hands of
bona fide holders the sum of $3,740,800, on which there are
warrants of interest now due and payable, amounting to
The principal of these bonds does not by
$1,521,965.30.
their terms mature until October 1st, 1876.
On the first day of July, 1863, the same company executed
to the defendant, William H. Upson, as trustee, a second
mortgage deed of its property acquired and to be acquired,
subject to the prior one to Flagg and Steadman, to secure the
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payment of bonds then issued by the same company, of which
there are now outstanding in the hands of bona fide holders
the amount of $2,409,000, on which interest coupons are now
due and unpaid, amounting to $1,093,345.89.. The principal
of the last-named bonds does not mature until July 1st, 1883.
After the consolidation, and on the 5th dayof October, 1365,
the Atlantic and Great Western Railway Company, the new
corporation, executed the series of bonds stated in the amended petition, and to secure the payment thereof, executed to
the plaintiff; as trustee, a mortgage deed of all their property,
real, personal and mixed, or acquired and to be acquired, but
subject to the special priority of liens created by the mort
gages executed by the original companies prior to the consolidation.
Of the bonds secured by this mortgage to the plaintiff there
has been issued the aggregate amount of $18,435,000, which
are now outstanding in'the hands of bonafide holders, and on
which there are coupons for interest now due and payable,
-amounting to $7,354,144.03.
The principal of these latter bonds does not mature until
October 15th, 1890.
After the granting clause in the first mortgage of the Atlantic and Great Western Railroad Company of Ohio, there
follows this language: "To have and to hold the said premises and every part thereof unto the said Azariah C. Flagg
and Charles J. Steadman, their successors in said trust and
assigns, that is to say : in case the said company shall fail to
pay the principal, or any part thereof, or any of the interest,
or any of said bonds at the time when the same may become
*doe and payable according to the tenor thereof when de.manded, then, after sixty days from each default, upon the
.request of the holder of such bond, the said Azariah C. Flagg
and Charles J. Steadman, their successors in said trust or assigns, may enter into and take possession of all or any part of
said premises and property, and as the attorneys in fact or
agents of said company by themselves or their agents or sub.stitutes duly constituted, have, use, and employ the same,
making from time to time all needful repairs, alterations and
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additions thereto, and after deducting the expenses of such
use, repairs, alterations, and additions, apply the proceeds
thereof to the payment of the principal and interest of all
Azariah C. Flagg
said bonds remaining unpaid; or, the .tid
1
and Charles J.Steadman, their successors in said trust or assigns, at his or their discretion, may, or on the written request
of at least the holders of one-half of the bonds then unpaid,
shall cause the said premises and property, or so much thereof as shall be necessary to pay and discharge the principal and
interest of all such of said bonds as may then be unpaid, to be sold
at public auction in the city of New York, or the city of Dayton, or Cincinnati, Ohio, giving at least ninety days' notice of
time, place and terms of sale; by publishing the same in. the
newspapers of good circulation in each of. the cities of New
York, Philadelphia, .Dayton and Cincinnati, and apply so
much of the proceeds as may be necessary. to the payment of
theprincipal and interest of said bonds remaining. unpaid."
Each and all of said. corporations are largely- insolvent.
The trustees in the first mortgage of the Atlantic and Gredt
Western Railroad Company of Ohio ask to have the property
covered by their .mortgage sold and the proceeds applied to
the payment of the principal and interest of the bonds secured by such mortgage, claiming in the first place that'the
principal thereof is due and payable by virtue of the aboverecited- provisions of their mortgage, default having been
made of the payment. of the overdue interest within sixty
days from its maturity, and secondly, that if such principal
is not due, the 374th section of the Code of Civil Procedure of
Ohio requires, in actions for the foreclosure of a mortgag
the whole- mortgaged property to be sold, the priorities of
lien determined and the fund arising from the sale distributed
accordingly. The trustee in the second mortgage of the last
named company, defendant, and the said. plaintift, severally
deny that the principal of the bonds secured by said first
mortgage of that company is due and payable, and the plaintiff claims the right-a claim conceded by the second mortgage trustee-to redeem the property under the first and seeond mortgages, by paying the amount now due thereon, and
the farther right of subrogra.ion to the rights of each of said
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mortgagees against the mortgagor, subject to the prior mwrtgages. In view of these facts and the claims of the parties,
what are their respective rights? It will be observed by recurring to the facts above stated, that there are $6,149,800
of principal on the first and second mortgage bonds not yet
due, $3,740,800 maturing October 1st, 1876, and $2,409,000
July 1st, 1883, unless this principal has become due by
reason of the nonpayment of the overdue interest. If the
court has discretionary power to order the whole property to
be sold and the fund distributed among the lien holders, the
first mortgage trustees being willing to receive the ,debt secured by their mortgage, even though it be held to be not
due; or if it has like discretionary power to order it sold, subject to the lien of the prior mortgages, such discretion should
be so exercised as to enable the parties to realize the greatest
sum for the property, while at the same time the rights of
each are fully protected. And here the fact should not be
overlooked that the property to be sold is a railroad of nearly
two hundred and fifty miles in length, in this State, with all
This vast property is
its equipments and appurtenances.
worth many millions of dollars, and consequently those able
to purchase it must be few in ntmber. The larger the sum
to be paid at once the more limited the number of bidders.
To my mind there is little doubt that a much larger sum will
be realized for this property if sold subject to the Hen for the
payment of the bonds as they mature, than if sold under an
order requiring its whole value to be paid on the day of sale.
By a sale subject to the incumbrances the more remote
bondholders will be better protected, inasmuch as their
chances of receiving a portion or all their debts will be im.proved.
Can such a sale be ordered consistently with the due observance of the legal and equitable rights of all the parties?
The claim of the first mortgagee, that the principal of the
bonds secured by that mortgage is due by the terms of the
instrument itself, inasmuch as there has been default of payment of the interest, is sought to be supported by the fol'owing authorities: N.yes v. Clar-, 7 Paige 179, Noonan v. Lee,
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2 Black 499 ; 28 Barb. 29, 37; Id. 60, 44;. Id. 336; 4 Taunt.
227; 5 Barn. & Adol. 40.
'
These authorities hold that if there be an express condition
in a mortgage, that upon default of payment of the interest asit matures, or an instalment of the principal, the whole debt
shall become due, such a condition is valid; -that the courts
will not interfere to relieve the mortgagor from payment of
the principal, but will enforce the condition according to its
terms. These authorities arp not, however, in point.
The terms of this first mortgage of the Atlantic and Great
Western Railroad Company of Ohio do not make the -principal due on non-payment of the interest as it matures; They
authorize the trustees, in case the company shall fail to pay
the principal or any part thereof, or any of the interest on
any of said bonds at the time when the'same mdy become
due and payable according to the tenor thereof when demand-ed, and after sixty days from"such default, on request of any
bohdholder, to take possession of and operate said railroad;'
aud after deducting expenses, etc., to apply the rem4inder of
the earnings to the payment of principal and interest of" all
uppaid bonds; or they are authorized to sell the property on'
giving ninety days notice, and apply the proceeds of the sale'.
in the same"manner.
The mortgage nowhere declares that the principal shaill"
become due upon default of payment of the interest. Power
to sell at public auction and apply the proceeds to all unpaid
bonds does not change the time when the principal of 'the
bonds is to become payable so as to authorize an action on
the bond or a proceeding to foreclose the mortgage in equity.
The case on this point is identical in .principle with that of
Hoden v. Gilbert, 7 Paige 208. It was there held on a simi-.
latclause in a mortgage that it was only intended to authorize a statute foreclosure in case of the non-payment of the instalments -within the time prescribed, and the right to retain
the principal and interest of the whole debt in case the instalment and costs were not paid before the sale, but that a mere
neglect to pay the instalment within the time prescribed did
not make the whole debt due and payable.
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In the case now before us a third mortgagee is seeking to
redeem the first and second mortgages. And it would seem
to be well settled that the right in equity to redeem belongs
to every person who has a legal or equitable lien on the
mortgaged property, provided lie comes in as privy in estate
with the mortgagor. Washburn Real Prop., Vol. 2, 3d Ed.
162; Gage v. Brewster, 31 New York 222; Brainard v.
Cooper, 10 New York 356; Moore v. Beasom, 44 N. H. 218;
The Western Insurace Co. v. The Eagle Fire Insurance Co., 1
Paige 284. The right to redeem any number of successive
mortgages may be mortgaged anew and each new mortgagee
succeeds to the rights of the mortgagor. Hilliard on Mortgages, Vol. 1 p. 299; Norton v. ]Warner et al., 3 Edw. Ch.
107.
On a petition to foreclose by the last mortgagee he will be
permitted to redeem all prior mortgages and to sell the whole
premises to refund to himself the redemption money and to
satisfy his own mortgage. The Western Insurance Co. v. The
Eagle Fire Insurance Co., 1 Paige 284; Bell v. The Mayor,
10 Paige 49; Vander Kemp v. Shelton, 11 Paige 39; Moore v.
Beasom, 44 N. Hl. 218; Norton v. Warner et al., 3 Edw. Oh.
107.
It certainly is a right which the mortgagor has, to pay the
debt -secured by a mortgage on his property, and thereby
redeem the property from sale; and if he fails to do so, he to
whom the right to redeem was last conveyed by mortgage
succeeds to that right by paying off all prior incumbrances.
And it is equally well settled that where a subsequent incumbrancer pays the debt secured by a prior mortgage, he is entitled to be substituted in equity to the rights of the owner
of such prior mortgage against the mortgagor. Norris v.
Moulton, 34 N. H. 392; Merritt v. Htosmer, 11 Gray 276;
-Knowles v. 1Rablin, 20 Iowa 101; Cheesebrough v. Milliard, 1
John Oh. 409; Garwood v. Eldridge,1 Green Ch.151; Lyman
v. Leittle, 15 Verm. 576; Washburn Real Prop. Vol. 2, 198.
This right of subrogation results to the junior incumbrancer
in virtue of his relation to the mortgaged property. His
mortgage conveyed to him the right to pay off former incumbrances and thereby to strengthen his own security; and
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vhen. he pays off the senior incumbrances, equity clothes
him with all the rights of him to whose claim he succeeds, and treats him as the equitable assignee thereof. .Afoore
v. Beasom, 44 N. H. 218; Aiken v. Gale,37 N. H. 505. But
the subsequent creditor can be subrogated to such rights only
I y full payment of the -debt; Dixon on Subrogation 122."
But this is when the whole.debt is due, for if the-subseqient
mortgagee cannot redeem ivwhere the debt is payable in instalments until the last instalment becomes due, his right of redemption would in many cases. be greatly impaired, if not
destroyed. The owner of the debt can foreclose when thefirst instalment becomes due, and to pay such instalment he
can sell the property. And it is certainly correct in principle
to hold that, when the right to foreclose the equity of redemption accrues, the right to redeem the premises from such.
foreclosure'attaches on paving the sum due, for the non-payment of which foreclosure is sought. The junior incumbrancer must be permitted to step in and redeem the premises,
when the senior incumbrancer has the right to have them
sold, if not redeemed. But such subrogation cannot take
.place to the prejudice of the senior mortgagee. Butler v. Elliott, 15 Cowen 187; Dixon on Subrogation 116. In other
words, payment ought not to place the prior mortgagee in a
worse situation than if payment were made by the mortgagor,
and therefore where an instalment of principal or interest of
the debt secured by the first mortgage is due and the same is
paid by a subsequent mortgagee, his lien upon the mortgaged.
property, which results from such payment, will be postponed
to the payment of the residue of the first mortgage debt.
But when -the amount so due is paid together with costs,
where theaction in foreclosure has been instituted, the right
of the prior mortgagee to a sale of the mortgaged property
ceases, and the most he can claim is the righit to apply to the
court for an order of sale to satisfy future instalments whe-d;
and as they become due, in the event they are not then paid.
Lansing v. Capron, 1 John. Ch. 617; -Holden v. Gilbert 7
Paige 211. The most material question in the case, and the
one most elaborately argued by counsel, is: Has the court
power, in view of section 374 of the Code of Civil Procedure
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of Ohio, to decree a sale of the mortgaged property under a
junior mortgage, subject to the outstanding lien of a senior
mortgage? Independent of the statute, that a court of equity
has this power would seem to be beyond question. The
Western Insurance Co. v. The Eagle Fire Insurance Co., 1
Paige 284; Holford v. Spafford, 10 Paige 43; Vanderkemp v.
5helton, 11 Paige 28; Wells v. Chapman, 4 Sand. Ch. 312;
Cox v. Wheeler, 7 Paige 257; Roll v. Smally, 2 Halst. Ch.
4641; The Gihon v. Bellville d- Co., 3 Halst. Ch. 531.
If the courts of this State have not now such power, it is
because of the 374th section of the code, which declares that,
"in the foreclosure of a mortgage, a sale of the mortgaged
premises shall in all cases be ordered."
It is claimed on the one hand that the term "mortgaged
premises" means the land, the thing, the entire ownership of
everybody in the property included in the descriptive words
of the mortgage; and upon the other, that the term means
only the amount or quantum of interest covered and conveyed
by the particular mortgage.
Did the Legislature intend by this section to take from a
court of equity the power before possessed, to decree the foreclosure of a mortgagor's equity, under junior incumbrances,
and leave the rights of superior lien-holders upon the property intact?
I think it did not so intend.
In England there are two general methods of foreclosing an
equity of redemption by bill, one termed a strict foreclosure,
whereby the mortgagee succeeds to the absolute ownership
of the estate, unless the mortgager pays the mortgage debt
within some time named by the court, usually six months;
the other method is by a sale of the property mortgaged.
These two methods of foreclosure have prevailed, and to
some extent now prevail, in many of the States of this Union.
Benedict v. Gilman, 4 Paige 58; Brainardv. Cooper, 10 New
York, 359; Dradley v. Chester Valley Railroad Company, 36
Penn. St. 150; Goodman v. White, 26 Conn. 317; Den v-Farris,1 Dutch. 633.
The effect of a strict foreclosure being to extinguish the
equity of redemption and vest in the mortgagee the full

-
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ownership, and an indefeasible title to the property for no
other considerations than the debt secured by the mortgage,
great hardship oftentimes resulted to the mortgagor. Cases
would not unfrequently arise where the mortgagor, being
unable, from straitened pecuniary circumstances, to pay the
mortgage debt within the time fixed by the decree, would be
compelled to part with his property for much less than its
real value. In such cases is pecuniary necessities became a
source of profit to his creditor. And the legislature, to relieve the mortgagor debtor from consequences so inequitable,
which may have grown out of a condition of poverty, provided that the property in all cases should be sold, the debt
paid, and the surplus of the proceeds of sale paid over to him
to whom it justly belonged. That a sale of the property
mortgaged instead of a strict foreclosure should in all cases
be ordered, is all, in niy opinion, that was intended by this
provision of the code of Ohfio. To give to the language of
section 374 any other construction than this would be to
create a" conflict between that section and sections 458 and
459 of the same code. Section 458 provides, that when a
judgment debtor has not personal or real property subject to
levy on execution sufficient to satisfy the judgment, any
equitable interest which he may have in real estate as
mortgagor, mortgagee or otherwise, shall be subject to the
payment of such judgment by action; and section 459 provides that upon the ascertainment of such equitableinterest the
same shall be sold, the sale to be conducted in all respects as a
sale upon execution at law.. The equitable interest must first
be ascertained and defined by the court, then appraised 'and
sold for not less than two-thirds of its appraised value. Coe
v. The . P. and I. B. B. Co., 10 01io State 372.
These two sections give to the judgment creditor the right
to nubject an equity in real estate to the payment of his debt,
and this equity may be sold subject to the rights and liens of
all others in and upon the property, whether legal or equitable. Now, can it be said that the legislature intended to
give to a judgment creditor who has no lien upon the property, until declared by the court, the right to sell an equitable
interest, subject to the rights or liens of others, and to withVor. XX_-38.
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hold such right from a mortgage creditor? If the second
mortgagee sue at law and recover a judgment upon his debt
and make that judgment the basis of an equitable action to
reach and subject his mortgagor's interest in the mortgaged
property, it is not doubted that he would be entitled to the
effectual aid of the court under the power conferred by section 458.
If he will ignore his mortgage liens and proceed as upon a
debt unsecured, he may cause the interest of the mortgagor in
the very property covered by his mortgage to be sold subject
to the lien of the first or any other mortgage. In such case
he becomes a judgment creditor, and notwithstanding he may
so proceed and sell, it is claimed, if he seeks to enforce in
equity the lien of his mortgage, a lien created by the express
contract of the parties the right to sell subject to the lien of
the mortgage is lost. Let us see how this doctrine would
work in practice?
A mortgages his farm to B to secure a loan for twenty
years; he then executes a second mortgage to C to secure a
loan for six months. At the expiration of the six months 0
proceeds to foreclose his mortgage, making B and A parties
defendant. B refuses to receive his debt until the expiration
of the time for which his money was loaned. The court
orders the interest of the three parties, A, B and C, to be
sold, conveying to the purchaser a clear title to the property.
The result must follow that B's interest in the fund realized
from the sale must be invested by the court and safely watched and protected for a period of more than nineteen years.
You cannot compel him to receive his money before it is
due. To do so would be not merely to impair the obligation
of his contract. It would annul and terminate it.
There is no doubt that as between the parties to the mortgage a second mortgage is a conveyance of the land, and
whenever the estate of the first mortgagee is divested, by the
payment of this debt or otherwise, the second mortgage operates fully as a conveyance of the whole estate. But so long
as the first mortgage is subsisting the second mortgagee as
between himself and the first mortgagee, acquires only his
mortgagor's equitable right of redemption.
Goodman v.

PENN V. RAILWAY COMPANY.

Thite, 26 Conn. 320. But it is further insisted, in support of
the construction claimed by the first mortgagees, that sec.
tion 458 requires the mortgaged premises to be appraised
and sold for not less than two-thirds of such appraised value,
and that the rule is established in this State, that where appraisement of real estate is required, the appraisers must return the money value of the land. This rule relates to sales
upon executions at law. -In Baird et, al. v. Kentland et al., 8
Ohio R. 21, where the interest of a mortgagor was levied
upon, the court held that the entire estate in the land must be
appraised, and that there was no authority to appraise themortgagor's equity of redemption.
The statute provided "that if execution be levied upon
land and tenements, the officer levying such execution shall
cause an inquest of three disinterested freeholders" and "administer to them an oath to appraise the land, and said freeholders shall return to said officer an estimate - of the real
value in money of said estate." The word "estate" in the
latter clause was held to mean the same as "land" in the
former. '.But in'the Lessee of Joseph Canby v. Foster, 12 Ohio
79, it is held that the freehold of an husband in 'his wife's
lands may be sold on execution. LANE 0. J. says: "The interest of the husband is a legal estate; it is a freehold during
the joint lives of himself and' wife, with a freehold in remainder to himself for life, as tenant by the courtesy and a remainder to the wife and her heirs in fee. It is a certain and
determinate interest, whose value may be easily' ascertained
by reference to well-known rules, it is in every sense his
land within the meaning of the statute."
And in speaking of lands incumbered by mortgages'he
says: "As no true, perfect authoritive binding estimate of the
value of the ihcumbrance can be taken by the appraisers, the
law forbids the inquiry and.admits of no sale except as of incumbered property. The effect of this rule is to throw into
chancerysales of mortgaged lands, except where the purchaser
is willing to encounter the risk of the burden."
Here it will be seen the sense of the word "land" is limited. Any legal estate, whether it be fee simple, an estate for
life, or a mere possessory interest may be sold on execution.
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Scott v. Douglass, 7 Ohio 228; Miner -v. Wrallace, 10 Ohio
403. But an equitable interest in real estate cannot be levied
upon. Haynes v. Parker,5 Ohio State 253.
The law has
never permitted it. Executions follow judgments at law.
The appraisers are not a proper tribunal to determine the extent of the equitable interest of a debtor in real estate. This
is the business of the court. But where such interest is ascertained, and its limits defined by the court, it is as easy of
valuation as an estate for life or years. The statute expressly
authorizes an equitable interest of a decedant's totate to be
appraised and sold. S. and 0. 589. But in pLodeedings in
foreclosure they are the "mortgaged premises" that are required to be appraised. No matter whethlr, the mortgagor
has a legal or equitable title. If the owner of an estate for
years mortgages it, upon foreclosure, the mortgaged property
to be appraized is the estate for years. If the purchaser of a
parcel of land by contract, upon which he has paid but onehalf of the purchase price, mortgagea his interest in such
lands, upon foreclosure, the mortgaged twzmises are his equitable interest, and not the whole lands. And if an equity of
redemption is conveyed by mortgage, such equity constitutes
the mortgaged property.
A decree may be entered, finding that the plaintiff is entitled to redeem the premises from sale under the first and second
mortgages, by paying the amount due thereon and ordering
that, unless the mortgagor pay the amount due on said third
mortgage within thirty days, said premises be sold thereunder, subject to the lien of said prior incumbrances, and that
to the extent of the amount paid to redeem by said plaintiff he
be suibrogated to the rights of the prior mortgagees.

